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The existence of internal threat, political instability and arms importation has led to 
the rise in defence expenditure in Nigeria. Whether defence expenditure, with or 
without threat has a benign or malign impact on the economic growth, is a matter 
that needs rigorous academic investigation. The objective of this study include 
examining the impacts of defence expenditure on economic growth in the presence 
of threats, political instability and arms importation in Nigeria. It also examines the 
impacts of defence research and development, defence components on the Nigeria`s 
economic growth. In addition it examines the asymmetric causal relationship 
between defence expenditure and economic growth in Nigeria. Using the robust 
Autoregressive Distributive Lag (ARDL) model, and asymmetric causality approach. 
The results reveal that defence expenditure-internal threat and defence-political 
instability interactions both have positive and significant impacts on economic 
growth. On the contrary, it reveals that defence arms import interaction has a 
significant and negative impact on growth in Nigeria. However, the impact of 
defence Research and Development on economic growth it is not significant as a 
result of insufficient funding. The result furthermore found that the causation 
between defence expenditure on economic growth in Nigeria is unidirectional from 
defence to economic growth. This implies that defence expenditure stimulates 
growth during the time of threat and civil unrest. The study recommends a revisit on 
the funding of defence sector in Nigeria. The current defence budget is grossly 
inadequate for the defence, considering the threats in Nigeria since it independence 
and recent threats such as the “Boko Haram” and Niger Delta Militancy among 
others. Regarding the defence R&D, proper funding, as well as management should 
be considered on Defence Industrial Cooperation of Nigeria to avoid over 
dependence on foreign sources. 
 

























Kewujudan ancaman dalaman, ketidakstabilan politik, dan pengimportan senjata 
telah meningkatkan perbelanjaan pertahanan di Nigeria. Sama ada perbelanjaan 
pertahanan, dengan atau tanpa ancaman mempunyai kesan benigna atau buruk 
terhadap pertumbuhan ekonomi, adalah satu perkara yang memerlukan siasatan 
akademik yang padu. Kajian ini mengkaji kesan perbelanjaan pertahanan terhadap 
pertumbuhan ekonomi dalam situasi  wujudnya ancaman, ketidakstabilan politik, dan 
pengimportan senjata di Nigeria. Ia juga menyiasat impak penyelidikan dan 
pembangunan pertahanan, iaitu komponen pertahanan, terhadap pertumbuhan 
ekonomi Nigeria. Selain itu, ia turut menilai hubungan sebab dan akibat yang 
asimetri antara perbelanjaan pertahanan dan pertumbuhan ekonomi di Nigeria. 
Menggunakan model Autoregresif Lag Teredar (ARDL) yang jitu dan pendekatan 
sebab akibat asimetri, keputusan kajian mendedahkan bahawa interaksi perbelanjaan 
pertahanan-ancaman dalaman dan pertahanan-ketidakstabilan politik mempunyai 
kesan positif dan signifikan terhadap pertumbuhan ekonomi. Sebaliknya, interaksi 
import senjata pertahanan mempunyai kesan yang signifikan dan negatif terhadap 
pertumbuhan. Walau bagaimanapun, kesan penyelidikan pertahanan dan 
pembangunan terhadap pertumbuhan ekonomi tidak signifikan akibat pembiayaan 
yang tidak mencukupi. Hasil kajian juga mendapati kesan perbelanjaan pertahanan 
terhadap pertumbuhan ekonomi adalah satu arah, yang menunjukkan bahawa 
perbelanjaan pertahanan merangsang pertumbuhan pada zaman ancaman dan 
rusuhan awam. Kajian ini mencadangkan penerokaan semula terhadap pembiayaan 
sektor pertahanan di Nigeria. Bajet pertahanan semasa adalah tidak memadai untuk 
pertahanan disebabkan oleh ancaman di Nigeria sejak kemerdekaan dan ancaman 
baru-baru ini seperti Boko Haram dan Militan Delta Niger antara lainnya. Mengenai 
penyelidikan dan pembangunan pertahanan, pembiayaan yang betul serta pengurusan 
perlu mempertimbang Kerjasama Pertahanan Industri Nigeria untuk mengelakkan 
terlalu bergantung kepada sumber luar. 
 
Kata kunci: perbelanjaan pertahanan, ancaman dalaman, pertumbuhan ekonomi, 
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1.1  Background of the Study 
Economic growth is a much-desired goal of every nation of the world. The need to 
study economic growth in countries became more attractive at the end of the Second 
World War. Then it became glaring that some nations experienced growth while 
others experienced either very minimal or no growth or even negative growth 
(Easterly, 2001).  The search for economic growth started from the works of Adam 
Smith, who led an enquiry into the ‘Wealth of Nations’ and Thomas Malthus, who 
postulated that population growth would affect economic growth. To the view of 
scholars, such as Lucas (1988) and Rostow (1960), investment in dams, roads and 
machines would lead to growth in backwards countries. Solow (1956) however, 
argues that investment in tools would not lead to growth, but it is technological 
change that would stimulate growth in a weak economy. This debate persists where 
economists built more sophisticated models in which one or more of the factors are 
endogenously determined (Todaro & Smith, 2003). 
 
While the search for economic growth continues, there has been rising debate over 
the impact of government expenditure on economic growth. Barro (1989) for 
instance, found the coefficient of government expenditure on economic growth 
frequently non-significant. When the impact of government expenditure is narrowed 
down to the field of defence expenditure on growth, an array of conclusions are 
reached using varying empirical and statistical methods. From the time Benoit (1973) 
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Appendix A  
Economic Growth Model 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag Estimates 
     ARDL(2,2,2,2,1,2,2,2,2) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion      
******************************************************************************* 
 Dependent variable is LRGDPK 
 30 observations used for estimation from 1985 to 2014 
******************************************************************************* 
 Regressor              Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
 LRGDPK(-1)                -.22327             .22533            -.99085[.378] 
 LRGDPK(-2)                 .54713             .15868             3.4480[.026] 
 LDE                       .071255             .12119             .58796[.588] 
 LDE(-1)                   -.92304             .15321            -6.0247[.004] 
 LDE(-2)                   -.71640             .17637            -4.0619[.015] 
 LAI                        .54872             2.3368             .23482[.826] 
 LAI(-1)                   18.8811             3.0750             6.1402[.004] 
 LAI(-2)                   15.3946             3.5852             4.2939[.013] 
 PI                       -.030959            .018709            -1.6547[.173] 
 PI(-1)                    -.11410            .026987            -4.2282[.013] 
 PI(-2)                   -.054297            .021906            -2.4787[.068] 
 THR                       -.13571            .031182            -4.3521[.012] 
 THR(-1)                   -.11118            .029936            -3.7139[.021] 
 LDETHR                     .24389            .080631             3.0248[.039] 
 LDETHR(-1)                 .35524             .12305             2.8870[.045] 
 LDETHR(-2)               -.084378            .054376            -1.5518[.196] 
 LDEPI                      .11730            .089878             1.3051[.262] 
 LDEPI(-1)                  .14550            .078070             1.8637[.136] 
 LDEPI(-2)                  .34999            .079839             4.3838[.012] 
 LDEAI                     -.50746             2.3343            -.21739[.839] 
 LDEAI(-1)                -18.8437             3.0721            -6.1338[.004] 
 LDEAI(-2)                -15.3528             3.5813            -4.2869[.013] 
 LEDU                       .74256             .26272             2.8265[.048] 
 LEDU(-1)                  -1.3985             .37957            -3.6846[.021] 
 LEDU(-2)                   .68682             .22451             3.0593[.038] 
 INPT                      71.7628            12.0927             5.9344[.004] 
******************************************************************************* 
 R-Squared                     .99837   R-Bar-Squared                   .98816 
 S.E. of Regression           .029264   F-Stat.    F(25,4)     97.8230[.000] 
 Mean of Dependent Variable    6.5142   S.D. of Dependent Variable      .26895 
 Residual Sum of Squares     .0034254   Equation Log-likelihood        93.5978 
 Akaike Info. Criterion       67.5978   Schwarz Bayesian Criterion     49.3822 
 DW-statistic                  3.1059 
******************************************************************************* 
  
Testing for existence of a level relationship among the variables in the ARDL model 
******************************************************************************* 
 F-statistic  95% Lower Bound  95% Upper Bound  90% Lower Bound  90% Upper Bound 
    8.5486          2.8218          4.3963          2.3301          3.7152 
  
 W-statistic  95% Lower Bound  95% Upper Bound  90% Lower Bound  90% Upper Bound 




*    Test Statistics  *        LM Version       *          F Version          * 
******************************************************************************* 
*                     *                         *                             * 
* A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ(1)  =   2.4862[.115]*F(1,2)       =   .18073[.712]* 
*                     *                         *                             * 
* B:Functional Form   *CHSQ(1)  =  .034747[.852]*F(1,3)       = .0034787[.957]* 
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*                     *                         *                             * 
* C:Normality         *CHSQ(2)  =   3.9834[.136]*       Not applicable        * 
*                     *                         *                             * 
* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ(1)  =  .068930[.793]*F(1,27)      =  .064329[.802]* 
******************************************************************************* 
   A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
   B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
   C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
 
 
           Estimated Long Run Coefficients using the ARDL Approach             
     ARDL(2,2,2,2,1,2,2,2,2) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion      
******************************************************************************* 
 Dependent variable is LRGDPK 
 30 observations used for estimation from 1985 to 2014 
******************************************************************************* 
 Regressor               Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
 LDE                        -2.3193             .35570            -6.5205[.003] 
 LAI                        51.5043             7.9648             6.4665[.003] 
 PI                         -.29485            .061146            -4.8220[.009] 
 THR                        -.36514            .064642            -5.6487[.005] 
 LDE_THR                     .76130             .16246             4.6860[.009] 
 LDE_PI                      .90631             .18769             4.8287[.008] 
 LDE_LAI                   -51.3263             7.9445            -6.4606[.003] 
 LEDU                       .045627             .18305             .24926[.815] 
 INPT                      106.1354            16.1307             6.5797[.003] 
******************************************************************************* 
  
Testing for existence of a level relationship among the variables in the ARDL model 
******************************************************************************* 
 F-statistic  95% Lower Bound  95% Upper Bound  90% Lower Bound  90% Upper Bound 
    8.5486          2.8218          4.3963          2.3301          3.7152 
  
 W-statistic  95% Lower Bound  95% Upper Bound  90% Lower Bound  90% Upper Bound 
   76.9375         25.3963         39.5670         20.9707         33.4365 
******************************************************************************* 
 If the statistic lies between the bounds, the test is inconclusive. If it is 
 above the upper bound, the null hypothesis of no level effect is rejected. If 
 it is below the lower bound, the null hypothesis of no level effect can't be 
 rejected. The critical value bounds are computed by stochastic simulations 
 using 20000 replications. 
 
         Error Correction Representation for the Selected ARDL Model           
     ARDL(2,2,2,2,1,2,2,2,2) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion      
******************************************************************************* 
 Dependent variable is dLRGDPK 
 30 observations used for estimation from 1985 to 2014 
******************************************************************************* 
 Regressor              Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
 dLRGDPK1                  -.54713             .15868            -3.4480[.005] 
 dLDE                      .071255             .12119             .58796[.567] 
 dLDE1                     -.71640             .17637            -4.0619[.002] 
 dLAI                       .54872             2.3368             .23482[.818] 
 dLAI1                    -15.3946             3.5852            -4.2939[.001] 
 dPI                      -.030959            .018709            -1.6547[.124] 
 dPI1                     -.054297            .021906            -2.4787[.029] 
 dTHR                      -.13571            .031182            -4.3521[.001] 
 dLDETHR                    .24389            .080631             3.0248[.011] 
 dLDETHR1                  .084378            .054376             1.5518[.147] 
 dLDEPI                     .11730            .089878             1.3051[.216] 
 dLDEPI1                   -.34999            .079839            -4.3838[.001] 
 dLDEAI                    -.50746             2.3343            -.21739[.832] 
 dLDEAI1                   15.3528             3.5813             4.2869[.001] 
 dLEDU                      .74256             .26272             2.8265[.015] 
 dLEDU1                    -.68682             .22451            -3.0593[.010] 




Appendix B  
Research and Development Model 
                    
                   Autoregressive Distributed Lag Estimates                    
          ARDL(1,2,0,0) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion           
******************************************************************************* 
 Dependent variable is LRGDPK 
 31 observations used for estimation from 1984 to 2014 
******************************************************************************* 
 Regressor              Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
 LRGDPK(-1)                 .84832             .10765             7.8806[.000] 
 LLFT                      24.5563             4.3913             5.5921[.000] 
 LLFT(-1)                 -41.8992             7.6338            -5.4886[.000] 
 LLFT(-2)                  23.9600             4.2660             5.6165[.000] 
 LINV                       .17553            .090313             1.9435[.063] 
 LRD                      -.042581            .011518            -3.6968[.001] 
 INPT                       .91337             .51293             1.7807[.087] 
******************************************************************************* 
 R-Squared                     .96490   R-Bar-Squared                   .95950 
 S.E. of Regression           .053359   F-Stat.    F(4,26)    178.6763[.000] 
 Mean of Dependent Variable    6.5107   S.D. of Dependent Variable      .26514 
 Residual Sum of Squares      .074027   Equation Log-likelihood        49.5912 
 Akaike Info. Criterion       44.5912   Schwarz Bayesian Criterion     41.0062 
 DW-statistic                  1.7379   Durbin's h-statistic      .91141[.362] 
******************************************************************************* 
  
Testing for existence of a level relationship among the variables in the ARDL model 
******************************************************************************* 
 F-statistic  95% Lower Bound  95% Upper Bound  90% Lower Bound  90% Upper Bound 
    7.0973          3.7320          5.0460          3.0233          4.1943 
  
 W-statistic  95% Lower Bound  95% Upper Bound  90% Lower Bound  90% Upper Bound 
    4.3890         14.9281         20.1841         12.0933         16.7770 
******************************************************************************* 
 If the statistic lies between the bounds, the test is inconclusive. If it is 
 above the upper bound, the null hypothesis of no level effect is rejected. If 
 it is below the lower bound, the null hypothesis of no level effect can't be 
 rejected. The critical value bounds are computed by stochastic simulations 
 using 20000 replications. 
  
  
                               Diagnostic Tests 
******************************************************************************* 
*    Test Statistics  *        LM Version       *          F Version          * 
******************************************************************************* 
*                     *                         *                             * 
* A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ(1)  =   .72142[.396]*F(1,25)      =   .59566[.447]* 
*                     *                         *                             * 
* B:Functional Form   *CHSQ(1)  =   1.3947[.238]*F(1,25)      =   1.1778[.288]* 
*                     *                         *                             * 
* C:Normality         *CHSQ(2)  =   .33719[.845]*       Not applicable        * 
*                     *                         *                             * 
* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ(1)  =   .61783[.432]*F(1,29)      =   .58973[.449]* 
******************************************************************************* 
   A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
   B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
   C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
   D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
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Estimated Long Run Coefficients using the ARDL Approach 
          ARDL(1,2,0,0) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion           
******************************************************************************* 
 Dependent variable is LRGDPK 
 30 observations used for estimation from 1985 to 2014 
******************************************************************************* 
 Regressor              Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
 LLFT                      23.0122             6.5785             3.4981[.002] 
 LINV                      -.73512             .36742            -2.0008[.057] 
 LRD                       -.28833             .16231            -1.7764[.089] 
 INPT                      -8.4469             3.8348            -2.2027[.038] 
******************************************************************************* 
  
Testing for existence of a level relationship among the variables in the ARDL model 
******************************************************************************* 
 F-statistic  95% Lower Bound  95% Upper Bound  90% Lower Bound  90% Upper Bound 
    2.2360          3.7038          5.0495          3.0123          4.1752 
  
 W-statistic  95% Lower Bound  95% Upper Bound  90% Lower Bound  90% Upper Bound 
    8.9439         14.8151         20.1980         12.0492         16.7008 
******************************************************************************* 
 If the statistic lies between the bounds, the test is inconclusive. If it is 
 above the upper bound, the null hypothesis of no level effect is rejected. If 
 it is below the lower bound, the null hypothesis of no level effect can't be 
 rejected. The critical value bounds are computed by stochastic simulations 
 using 20000 replications. 
 
         Error Correction Representation for the Selected ARDL Model           
          ARDL(1,1,2,0,0) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion           
******************************************************************************* 
 Dependent variable is dLRGDPK 
 30 observations used for estimation from 1985 to 2014 
******************************************************************************* 
 Regressor              Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
 dLRGDPK1                  -.54713             .15868            -3.4480[.005] 
 dLLFT                     10.7477             3.4844             3.0845[.005] 
 dLLFT1                   -11.7444             3.6366            -3.2295[.004] 
 dLINV                     -.11887            .051638            -2.3019[.030] 
 dLRD                     -.046621            .012458            -3.7424[.001] 









                   Autoregressive Distributed Lag Estimates                    
        ARDL(1,2,0,0,0,0) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion         
******************************************************************************* 
 Dependent variable is LRGDPK 
 30 observations used for estimation from 1985 to 2014 
******************************************************************************* 
 Regressor              Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
 LRGDPK(-1)                 .46048             .12583             3.6595[.001] 
 LLFT                      13.2610             4.5643             2.9054[.008] 
 LLFT(-1)                 -22.9682             7.3133            -3.1406[.005] 
 LLFT(-2)                  13.9233             3.9062             3.5644[.002] 
 LINV                      -.10289            .048722            -2.1119[.047] 
 LEXA                       1.7432             .73503             2.3716[.027] 
 LEXAF                     -1.6882             1.4861            -1.1360[.269] 
 LEXN                       1.7032             1.6081             1.0591[.302] 
 INPT                      -8.1306             1.5588            -5.2159[.000] 
******************************************************************************* 
 R-Squared                     .97896   R-Bar-Squared                   .97094 
 S.E. of Regression           .045849   F-Stat.    F(8,21)    122.1135[.000] 
 Mean of Dependent Variable    6.5142   S.D. of Dependent Variable      .26895 
 Residual Sum of Squares      .044144   Equation Log-likelihood        55.2542 
 Akaike Info. Criterion       46.2542   Schwarz Bayesian Criterion     39.9488 
 DW-statistic                  1.9716   Durbin's h-statistic      .10725[.915] 
******************************************************************************* 
  
Testing for existence of a level relationship among the variables in the ARDL model 
******************************************************************************* 
 F-statistic  95% Lower Bound  95% Upper Bound  90% Lower Bound  90% Upper Bound 
    4.9350          3.1173          4.6127          2.5745          3.8443 
  
 W-statistic  95% Lower Bound  95% Upper Bound  90% Lower Bound  90% Upper Bound 
   29.6103         18.7037         27.6759         15.4469         23.0660 
******************************************************************************* 
 If the statistic lies between the bounds, the test is inconclusive. If it is 
 above the upper bound, the null hypothesis of no level effect is rejected. If 
 it is below the lower bound, the null hypothesis of no level effect can't be 
 rejected. The critical value bounds are computed by stochastic simulations 
 using 20000 replications. 
  
  
                               Diagnostic Tests 
******************************************************************************* 
*    Test Statistics  *        LM Version       *          F Version          * 
******************************************************************************* 
*                     *                         *                             * 
* A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ(1)  = .0031882[.955]*F(1,20)      = .0021257[.964]* 
*                     *                         *                             * 
* B:Functional Form   *CHSQ(1)  =   .80002[.371]*F(1,20)      =   .54796[.468]* 
*                     *                         *                             * 
* C:Normality         *CHSQ(2)  =   3.5095[.173]*       Not applicable        * 
*                     *                         *                             * 
* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ(1)  =  .044002[.834]*F(1,28)      =  .041129[.841]* 
******************************************************************************* 
   A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
   B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
   C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 






           Estimated Long Run Coefficients using the ARDL Approach             
        ARDL(1,2,0,0,0,0) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion         
******************************************************************************* 
 Dependent variable is LRGDPK 
 30 observations used for estimation from 1985 to 2014 
******************************************************************************* 
 Regressor              Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
 LLFT                       7.8146             1.5371             5.0838[.000] 
 LINV                      -.19071             .10184            -1.8727[.075] 
 LEXA                       3.2311             1.5513             2.0829[.050] 
 LEXAF                     -3.1291             2.9606            -1.0569[.303] 
 LEXN                       3.1568             3.0496             1.0352[.312] 
 INPT                     -15.0701             1.9005            -7.9296[.000] 
******************************************************************************* 
  
Testing for existence of a level relationship among the variables in the ARDL model 
******************************************************************************* 
 F-statistic  95% Lower Bound  95% Upper Bound  90% Lower Bound  90% Upper Bound 
    4.9350          3.1173          4.6127          2.5745          3.8443 
  
 W-statistic  95% Lower Bound  95% Upper Bound  90% Lower Bound  90% Upper Bound 
   29.6103         18.7037         27.6759         15.4469         23.0660 
******************************************************************************* 
 If the statistic lies between the bounds, the test is inconclusive. If it is 
 above the upper bound, the null hypothesis of no level effect is rejected. If 
 it is below the lower bound, the null hypothesis of no level effect can't be 
 rejected. The critical value bounds are computed by stochastic simulations 
 using 20000 replications. 
 
 
         Error Correction Representation for the Selected ARDL Model           
        ARDL(1,2,0,0,0,0) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion         
******************************************************************************* 
 Dependent variable is dLRGDPK 
 30 observations used for estimation from 1985 to 2014 
******************************************************************************* 
 Regressor              Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
 dLRGDPK1                  -.44713             .15868            -3.4480[.005] 
 dLLFT                     13.2610             4.5643             2.9054[.008] 
 dLLFT1                   -13.9233             3.9062            -3.5644[.002] 
 dLINV                     -.10289            .048722            -2.1119[.046] 
 dLEXA                      1.7432             .73503             2.3716[.027] 
 dLEXAF                    -1.6882             1.4861            -1.1360[.268] 
 dLEXN                      1.7032             1.6081             1.0591[.301] 
 ecm(-1)                   -.53952             .12583            -4.2876[.000] 
******************************************************************************
 Appendix C  
Asymmetric Causality  
DE+ to GDP+ 
This program performs an asymmetric causality test developed by Hatemi-J (2012).  
Reference: Hatemi-J (2012) Asymmetric Causality Tests with an Application, Empirical Economics, 43:447_456 
 
This program code is the copyright of the authors. Applications are allowed only if proper reference and acknowledgments are provided.  
For non-Commercial applications only. 
 
No performance guarantee is made. Bug reports are welcome.  
  
AhatTU= 
 -3.4235088e+010    1.0090531        35.334215       4.2893255e+010     -0.10510747       -71.811229  -4.0487966e+010     0.092886632        
  3.1117674e+008    0.00011692263    1.6629096      -2.1101154e+008     -0.00082807344     -0.46311271  2.0094870e+008    0.00067728830       
  0.23426455       -6.9186569e-015  -4.6536320e-012  1.2499832          1.6740568e-014   6.0311661e-012   -0.30826727     2.1965732e-014 
   
AhatTR= 
 -3.5988419e+010       0.96806206       0.00000000     4.6567596e+010   -0.037566640      0.00000000     -4.7037692e+010    0.069872302        
  3.1117674e+008       0.00011692263    1.6629096     -2.1101154e+008   -0.00082807344   -0.46311271      2.0094870e+008    0.00067728830  
  0.23426455          -6.9186569e-015  -4.6536320e-012 1.2499832        1.6740568e-014    6.0311661e-012 -0.30826727       2.1965732e-014   
----------------------------------------- 
Information criterion used; lags based on that =Hatemi-J Criterion (HJC) 2.000  
Varorder chosen by information criterion (excluding augmentation lag(s)) is 2.000  
additional lags=1.000  











This program performs an asymmetric causality test developed by Hatemi-J (2012).  
Reference: Hatemi-J (2012) Asymmetric Causality Tests with an Application, Empirical Economics, 43:447_456 
 
This program code is the copyright of the authors. This program code is the copyright of the authors. Applications are allowed only if 




  3.5270072e+009       0.90023908       -1.4528217  -5.4341599e+008     -0.026937212        3.5054291   1.9541471e+009  
       84521635.    -0.0011371703        1.0795248  -1.6420204e+008    0.00071734546     -0.085823360   2.2372328e+008  
     -0.16367251  -4.0926558e-013  -8.7648350e-012        1.2740392   1.8080829e-013   1.4353625e-011      -0.28874489 
  
AhatTR= 
  3.4130834e+009       0.90009028       0.00000000  -3.0898607e+008     -0.025719292        2.0489361   1.6369805e+009  
       84521635.    -0.0011371703        1.0795248  -1.6420204e+008    0.00071734546     -0.085823360   2.2372328e+008  
     -0.16367251  -4.0926558e-013  -8.7648350e-012        1.2740392   1.8080829e-013   1.4353625e-011      -0.28874489  
----------------------------------------- 
Information criterion used; lags based on that =Hatemi-J Criterion (HJC) 1.000  
Varorder chosen by information criterion (excluding augmentation lag(s)) is 1.000  
additional lags=1.000  









DE+ to GDP- 
 
This program performs an asymmetric causality test developed by Hatemi-J (2012).  
Reference: Hatemi-J (2012) Asymmetric Causality Tests with an Application, Empirical Economics, 43:447_456 
 
This program code is the copyright of the authors. This program code is the copyright of the authors. Applications are allowed only if 




  9.1663097e+009       0.81712759       -4.5361582   6.0945202e+010       0.10526717        51.650915  -5.7652022e+010  
 -1.1914355e+008   -0.00027341947        1.0920909        42281196.    0.00029422555      -0.11315874        20439625.  
      0.22390637   1.8354227e-015  -7.0936017e-012        1.2551992   1.7744331e-014   5.4520903e-012      -0.28572687  
 
AhatTR= 
  1.0687393e+010       0.81487290       0.00000000   5.7428947e+010       0.10743971        47.256223  -5.4534834e+010  
 -1.1914355e+008   -0.00027341947        1.0920909        42281196.    0.00029422555      -0.11315874        20439625.  
      0.22390637   1.8354227e-015  -7.0936017e-012        1.2551992   1.7744331e-014   5.4520903e-012      -0.28572687  
----------------------------------------- 
Information criterion used; lags based on that =Hatemi-J Criterion (HJC) 1.000  
Varorder chosen by information criterion (excluding augmentation lag(s)) is 1.000  
additional lags=1.000  








DE- to GDP+ 
 
This program performs an asymmetric causality test developed by Hatemi-J (2012).  
Reference: Hatemi-J (2012) Asymmetric Causality Tests with an Application, Empirical Economics, 43:447_456 
 
This program code is the copyright of the authors. This program code is the copyright of the authors. Applications are allowed only if proper 
reference and acknowledgments are provided. For non-Commercial applications only.No performance guarantee is made. Bug reports are welcome.  
  
AhatTU= 
 -4.5245367e+010       0.81221691        1.6864994   5.0949606e+010       0.11110042        47.769040  -5.6016106e+010  
       73436426.   -0.00023554493        1.0872450  -1.4635815e+008    0.00028296827      -0.11973666   2.0245962e+008  
     -0.16983602   5.3316763e-014  -9.7610322e-012        1.2723172  -5.8023644e-014   1.3377251e-011      -0.28892188 
  
AhatTR= 
 -4.5108970e+010       0.81318819       0.00000000   5.0651513e+010       0.11023630        49.379056  -5.5626778e+010  
       73436426.   -0.00023554493        1.0872450  -1.4635815e+008    0.00028296827      -0.11973666   2.0245962e+008  
     -0.16983602   5.3316763e-014  -9.7610322e-012        1.2723172  -5.8023644e-014   1.3377251e-011      -0.28892188  
----------------------------------------- 
Information criterion used; lags based on that =Hatemi-J Criterion (HJC) 1.000  
Varorder chosen by information criterion (excluding augmentation lag(s)) is 1.000  
additional lags=1.000  









GDP+ to DE+ 
 
This program performs an asymmetric causality test developed by Hatemi-J (2012).  
Reference: Hatemi-J (2012) Asymmetric Causality Tests with an Application, Empirical Economics, 43:447_456 
 
This program code is the copyright of the authors. This program code is the copyright of the authors. Applications are allowed only if 




  3.1117674e+008        1.6629096    0.00011692262  -2.1101154e+008      -0.46311271   -0.00082807345   2.0094870e+008      -0.17516685     
 -3.4235088e+010        35.334215        1.0090531   4.2893255e+010       -71.811229      -0.10510747  -4.0487966e+010        37.138261       
      0.23426455  -4.6536320e-012  -6.9186574e-015        1.2499832   6.0311662e-012   1.6740567e-014      -0.30826727  -2.6742868e-012    
 
AhatTR= 
  3.1863978e+008        1.6449330       0.00000000  -2.0085200e+008      -0.42784977       0.00000000   1.5785145e+008      -0.19447531  
-  
 -3.4235088e+010        35.334215        1.0090531   4.2893255e+010       -71.811229      -0.10510747  -4.0487966e+010        37.138261       
      0.23426455  -4.6536320e-012  -6.9186574e-015        1.2499832   6.0311662e-012   1.6740567e-014      -0.30826727  -2.6742868e-012    
----------------------------------------- 
Information criterion used; lags based on that =Hatemi-J Criterion (HJC) 2.000  
Varorder chosen by information criterion (excluding augmentation lag(s)) is 2.000  
additional lags=1.000  









GDP- to DE- 
  
This program performs an asymmetric causality test developed by Hatemi-J (2012).  
Reference: Hatemi-J (2012) Asymmetric Causality Tests with an Application, Empirical Economics, 43:447_456 
 
This program code is the copyright of the authors. This program code is the copyright of the authors. Applications are allowed only if proper 
reference and acknowledgments are provided. For non-Commercial applications only. No performance guarantee is made. Bug reports are welcome.  
  
AhatTU= 
       84521635.        1.0795248    -0.0011371703  -1.6420204e+008     -0.085823360    0.00071734546   2.2372328e+008  
  3.5270072e+009       -1.4528217       0.90023908  -5.4341599e+008        3.5054291     -0.026937212   1.9541471e+009  
     -0.16367251  -8.7648350e-012  -4.0926558e-013        1.2740392   1.4353625e-011   1.8080829e-013      -0.28874489 
  
AhatTR= 
       79301327.        1.0794111       0.00000000  -1.7102882e+008     -0.087793269   -0.00029091346   2.2901594e+008  
  3.5270072e+009       -1.4528217       0.90023908  -5.4341599e+008        3.5054291     -0.026937212   1.9541471e+009  
     -0.16367251  -8.7648350e-012  -4.0926558e-013        1.2740392   1.4353625e-011   1.8080829e-013      -0.28874489  
----------------------------------------- 
Information criterion used; lags based on that =Hatemi-J Criterion (HJC) 1.000  
Varorder chosen by information criterion (excluding augmentation lag(s)) is 1.000  
additional lags=1.000  









GDP+ to DE- 
 
This program performs an asymmetric causality test developed by Hatemi-J (2012).  
Reference: Hatemi-J (2012) Asymmetric Causality Tests with an Application, Empirical Economics, 43:447_456 
 
This program code is the copyright of the authors. This program code is the copyright of the authors. Applications are allowed only if proper 
reference and acknowledgments are provided. For non-Commercial applications only. No performance guarantee is made. Bug reports are welcome.  
  
AhatTU= 
  2.5487545e+008        1.6439418    -0.0014416043  -1.6116037e+008      -0.42952527  -1.6664417e-005   1.4457694e+008      -0.19143700    .  
 -3.3638170e+009       -1.5327630       0.95655738   7.0822117e+008        1.9838225     0.0026030504  -3.1546114e+009      -0.35007233     -  
      0.25594971  -4.1477742e-012  -1.9591629e-013        1.2455471   4.9968646e-012   2.3821748e-013      -0.30871794  -4.1028943e-013    
 
AhatTR= 
  2.7266800e+008        1.6459022       0.00000000  -1.7714361e+008      -0.42918714       0.00000000   1.4912189e+008      -0.19406135   -  
 -3.3638170e+009       -1.5327630       0.95655738   7.0822117e+008        1.9838225     0.0026030504  -3.1546114e+009      -0.35007233     -  
      0.25594971  -4.1477742e-012  -1.9591629e-013        1.2455471   4.9968646e-012   2.3821748e-013      -0.30871794  -4.1028943e-013    
----------------------------------------- 
Information criterion used; lags based on that =Hatemi-J Criterion (HJC) 2.000  
Varorder chosen by information criterion (excluding augmentation lag(s)) is 2.000  
additional lags=1.000  









GDP- to DE+ 
 
 This program code is the copyright of the authors. Applications are allowed only if proper reference and acknowledgments are provided. For non-
Commercial applications only. 
No performance guarantee is made. Bug reports are welcome.  
  
AhatTU= 
 -2.7253824e+008        1.6521820    -0.0011958954  -7.8135559e+008      -0.44010476   -0.00027723355   4.5290815e+008      -0.19051167     
  5.6882348e+009       -1.5525218       0.94060663   2.6175988e+009        1.9841414    0.00054161131  -1.8196876e+009      -0.28667062    -  
  -0.17239514  -7.8331183e-012  -3.0556835e-013        1.2897090   1.1605222e-011   7.7969372e-014      -0.33977152  -3.2285125e-012    
 
AhatTR= 
 -2.8875444e+008        1.6537892       0.00000000  -7.8602631e+008      -0.43932069       0.00000000   4.4646671e+008      -0.19330443    - 
  5.6882348e+009       -1.5525218       0.94060663   2.6175988e+009        1.9841414    0.00054161131  -1.8196876e+009      -0.28667062    -  
 -0.17239514  -7.8331183e-012  -3.0556835e-013        1.2897090   1.1605222e-011   7.7969372e-014      -0.33977152  -3.2285125e-012    
----------------------------------------- 
Information criterion used; lags based on that =Hatemi-J Criterion (HJC) 2.000  
Varorder chosen by information criterion (excluding augmentation lag(s)) is 2.000  
additional lags=1.000  
Wstat = 0.104  
Wcriticalvals= 
18.028  
7.561  
4.838  
 
 
 
